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Capital Account Restrictions
JACQUES MINIANE*
This paper extends the IMF’s post-1996 disaggregated capital account indices back
to 1983 for a representative sample of 34 countries. All the information used to con-
struct the indices comes from IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions and is widely available. It is shown that the disaggregated
indices do a better job than the pre-1996 single dummy in reflecting both global
trends toward capital account liberalization and country-specific liberalization
episodes that occurred during the period. Given the frequency of IMF reporting pro-
cedures, the disaggregated indices still fail to accurately track temporary control
programs designed to fight off crises. Moreover, the lack of systematic information
on enforcement means that the indices remain de jure. Some tentative solutions to
these limitations are suggested. [JEL C82, F02, F33]
T
he Asian crisis of late 1997 and the subsequent collapses in Russia, Brazil, and
Argentina have sparked a vigorous debate about how best to improve the cur-
rent global financial architecture. In this context, recent papers by De Gregorio,
Edwards, and Valdés (2000), Edison and Reinhart (2001), and Miniane and Rogers
(2003) have tried to assess the effectiveness of capital controls in shaping the size
and maturity of capital flows.
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plete data set can be obtained from the author at jminiane@imf.org.One fundamental limitation in the capital controls literature has been the lack of
a reliable measure of capital account openness. Capital controls can take many dif-
ferent forms, making it time-consuming to track all changes in restrictions within a
single country. Moreover, the construction of any capital controls index raises the
problem of aggregation. By how much should a measure drop if a country relaxes
one of its many restrictions? Last but not least, the effectiveness of capital controls
depends crucially on the government’s willingness and ability to enforce them.
Assuming one has qualitative evidence on enforceability, how should it be weighted
in the index?
As a result of the lack of a reliable index of capital controls, many studies trying
to assess the ability of capital controls to affect financial flows have followed
a case-study approach.1 Papers that have attempted to study the effects of capital
controls cross-sectionally, such as Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), have commonly
relied on the 0/1 IMF dummies. The pre-1996 editions of IMF’s Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) provide dummies
for all member countries in six separate categories: bilateral payments arrangements
with members and nonmembers, restrictions on payments for current account trans-
actions, restrictions on payments for capital account transactions, import surcharges,
advance import deposits, and surrender or repatriation requirements for export pro-
ceeds. Besides the obvious limitations of a dichotomic dummy, Eichengreen (2001)
has pointed out that the dummy for capital account transactions accounts only for
restrictions on residents, not on nonresidents.
To  remedy the lack of suitable capital control measures, the IMF changed
reporting procedures starting with the 1996 edition of the AREAER.2 For each of
the above mentioned categories, the “new” AREAER provides dummies in not
one but several different subcategories of transactions. In the case of capital
account transactions, there are 13 such subcategories, some of which are in turn
further disaggregated.3 Moreover, a distinction is now made between controls on
inflows and outflows.
The new reporting procedures have prompted several authors, some within
the IMF’s staff, to build capital control indices based on the disaggregated
AREAER classification (Table 1).4 Barry Johnston and Natalia Tamirisa are
rightly credited with initiating this trend (Johnston and Tamirisa, 1998; Tamirisa,
1999 and 2003). The authors build indices for 45 countries by averaging over all
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1See Dooley (1996), Eichengreen (2001), and Edison and others (2002) for surveys of the capital con-
trols literature.
2Note that the new reporting procedures covered only 52 countries in the first year and were subse-
quently extended to all the member countries.
3The following subcategories are related to capital account transactions: capital market securities,
money market instruments, collective investment securities, derivatives and other instruments, commercial
credits, financial credits, guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities; direct investment, liquidation
of direct investment, real estate transactions, personal capital movements, provisions specific to commer-
cial banks and other credit institutions; and provisions specific to institutional investors. These subcate-
gories are in turn disaggregated in the new AREAER.
4Table 1, based on a similar table by Edison and others (2002), summarizes the main features of var-
ious indices presented in this paper.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.possible 0/1 dummies in the new AREAER. Theirs may be the most disaggregated
de jure measure yet, but it is limited by the fact that it covers only the post-1996
period.5 Rossi (1999) tries to extend period coverage for a small sample of 15
countries. He builds Johnston and Tamirisa-style indices for 1997 as well as a
“subjective” index for 1989. Values for intermediate years are approximated by a
linear interpolation if the country experienced a gradual change in restrictions
between the endpoints, or by a one-time change otherwise. Brune and others
(2001) can only be praised for the coverage of their measure: 173 countries for
the period 1973–1999. The index is a sum of 0/1 dummies over 5 different cate-
gories, which are in turn an aggregation of the 13 subcategories in the new
AREAER.6 Four of the five categories separate controls on inflows and outflows.
The main drawback of Brune and others’ data is that they are not publicly avail-
able. Also, early editions of the AREAER often lack information to code all five
categories, let alone inflows and outflows separately.7 It remains an open ques-
tion how the authors tackled this problem.
Parallel to these de jure, AREAER-based efforts, researchers have been con-
structing de facto indices of capital account openness.8 Edison and Warnock
(2003) compute the ratio of total market capitalization of equities that are avail-
able for purchase by foreign investors over total market capitalization.9While their
index has the great advantage of being both monthly and readily interpretable,
restrictions on capital inflows for equity purchases are a small subset of possible
capital controls. Another de facto index is based on the work of Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001) on countries’net external wealth and consists of the ratio of a coun-
try’s portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities over GDP. This is, in a
sense, a capital account counterpart to the trade openness measures commonly
used in the literature.
This paper builds on the tradition of disaggregated AREAER-based measures
initiated by Johnston and Tamirisa. Specifically, I use text information in the
AREAER to extend this methodology back to 1983 for a sample of 34 countries,
Jacques Miniane
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5Tamirisa (2003) also exploits the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(OECD) Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements for years back to 1990. This publication provides
information similar to what appears in the AREAER and is equally disaggregated. The main drawback is
that the data are restricted to OECD countries.
6One of the categories deals with proceeds from invisible transactions, which is separate from capital
transactions in the AREAER.
7As will become clear, many of the dummies in my sample did indeed lack explicit information. Given
the coverage of Brune and others (2001) of very poor countries with sparse information and their separa-
tion of controls on inflows and outflows, the problem is likely to be even more pervasive in their sample.
8There are also measures that take advantage of de jure AREAER information without following the
disaggregated methodology. A good example is Quinn (1997), who does not disaggregate over several sub-
categories of transactions but takes into account the severity of restrictions. This is an important step, but
severity is a subjective concept, as is the aggregation over restrictions that vary in their degree of restric-
tiveness. Also, note that most of Quinn’s data is not publicly available.
9There are some adjustments for cross-holdings of equities, state ownership, and so forth. Note that
the Edison and Warnock index can be related to the measures by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) or Henry
(2000), who construct dummies to date stock market liberalization periods.thus extending period coverage significantly. As will be shown in the paper, the
disaggregated indices do a better job than the standard pre-1996 dummy at track-
ing both global trends towards capital account liberalization as well as country-
specific liberalization episodes. Unlike the Johnston and Tamirisa data, my indices
do not disaggregate beyond the 13 main subcategories of capital account transac-
tions in the post-1996 classification. Moreover, they do not separate between con-
trols of inflows and outflows despite a priori advantages of doing so, since it is
questionable whether the pre-1996 editions of the AREAER contain enough text
information for such a disaggregation. The indices are very transparent in this
regard, as I have systematically indicated when the coding of a dummy was done
through explicit information in the text and when it was the result of logical induc-
tion as explained further in the paper. To see why this is relevant information, note
that a full 25 percent of the dummies for the early 1980s were coded through log-
ical induction because of a lack of explicit indications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents and justifies the choice of
sample countries and explains in detail the sources of information and the method-
ology used in the construction of the indices. Section II compares the index with
the pre-1996 IMF single dummy, as well as with the de facto measure by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (LMF).10 Section III addresses the limitations of the post-1996
methodology. In particular, the indices miss temporary capital control programs
designed to fight off external crises, and their purely de jure nature says nothing
about countries’ enforcement of controls. Some possible solutions are suggested.
Section IV contains concluding remarks.
I. Sample and Methodology
Countries and Period Covered
The choice of countries in the data set is somewhat arbitrary. The original
impulse behind this project was to improve on the existing IMF single dummies
to better study whether capital controls insulate countries from foreign monetary
shocks (see Miniane and Rogers, 2003). Country selection for the indices was
thus restricted by the availability of data necessary to pursue Miniane and Rogers’s
research. The list of countries includes Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg (pooled with Belgium
before 1996), Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The data are annual and cover the period 1983 to 2000.11
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10Comparison with the Rossi (1999) and Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) measures is not possible
because of their different country/period coverage. Quinn has made only four years of data publicly avail-
able, and the Brune measure is not available at all.
11The paper later discusses a possible method to make the indices monthly in a relatively time-efficient
manner.Despite the arbitrariness of the list, it is worth noting that the sample is diverse
along several lines. The five main continents are represented, with particular
emphasis on Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Countries range from poor (India,
Ecuador) to very rich (Germany, Japan, etc.), with intermediate cases like Chile or
Mexico. The whole spectrum of exchange rate arrangements is covered, from a
full-blown currency board in Hong Kong, to a managed float in countries like Chile,
to a free float in several OECD countries. It is hoped that this diversity somewhat
compensates for the relative shortness of the list.12
Information Sources
There are many sources of information on capital controls, including country bul-
letins on laws enacted. A notable source is the AREAER, which not only contains the
previously mentioned dummies but also contains very detailed reports on each coun-
try’s exchange arrangement, administration of control, prescription of currency, reg-
ulations on import and import payments, payments for invisibles, exports and export
proceeds, proceeds from invisibles, capital account transactions, and gold. For each
country there is also a section called “Changes,” where the date and details of any
change in regulations in any of these categories is registered. As we shall see, the
“Changes” section played a crucial role for the construction of my data.
I have decided to use the AREAER as the sole source of information. The rea-
sons for this decision are twofold. First, the AREAER is the only publication that
records and classifies the information in a systematic way, both throughout the
years and, more importantly, throughout the countries. The same cannot be said
about local publications, and this becomes an important consideration when con-
structing an index. Second, the AREAER is easy to access to verify the indices or
their extension to a wider sample of countries or years.
Methodology
The “new” AREAER introduced in 1996 subdivides capital account transactions
into 13 subcategories, to which I added a fourteenth as explained below:
•C apital market securities: shares or other securities of a participating nature, and
bonds and other securities with an original maturity of more than one year.
• Money market instruments: securities with an original maturity of one year or
less, such as certificates of deposit, Treasury bills, and so forth.
• Collective investment securities: share certificates or any evidence of investor
interest in an institution for collective investment, such as mutual funds.
•D erivatives and other instruments: refers to operations in other negotiable instru-
ments and nonsecuritized claims not covered under the previous three items.
• Commercial credits: covers operations directly linked to international trade 
transactions.
• Financial credits: credits other than commercial credits.
Jacques Miniane
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12The medium-term goal is to extend the data to a wider sample of countries.•G uarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities: securities pledged for pay-
ment of a contract, such as warrants, letters of credit, and so on.
•D irect investment.
•R epatriation of profits or liquidation of direct investment.
• Real estate transactions.
•P ersonal capital movements: not considered in this paper because of a lack of
consistent information in past editions of the AREAER.
•P rovisions specific to commercial banks and other credit institutions: regulations
that are specific to these institutions, such as monetary and prudential controls.
•P rovisions specific to institutional investors: one common example is a limit on
the share of the institution’s portfolio that may be held in foreign assets.
• Multiple exchange rate arrangements. These are not part of the capital account sub-
division of the AREAER, but I felt it was an important form of capital control. The
AREAER systematically provides information on multiple exchange rate regimes.
The rules to construct dummies in each category are as follows:
•T he starting point is the disaggregated dummies provided by the 1996 to 2001
editions of the AREAER. Note that these dummies correspond to the period 1995
to 2000, since each edition reports on restrictions existing as of December 31 of
the previous year.
• Using text information in the 1995 edition, I fill as many of the 13 subcategories
as possible for the year 1994. The rule is always the following: one if at least one
restriction for that item, zero otherwise.
•T he next step is the “Changes” sections of both the 1995 and 1996 editions. For
instance, the text in the 1995 edition might not mention anything about subcat-
egory X in 1994, but the “Changes” section in the 1996 edition might refer to
the elimination of some restriction in X during 1995. If one subcategory
remains blank after completing this process, I assign it the same value it had in
1995. I call this rule “filling by default.”
• In the rare case that a subcategory has an NA (not available) value for 1995, I
keep the NA unless the text has some explicit information for 1994.
•O nce the 1994 indices have been completed, the process is repeated for 1993,
1992, ...,b a c k  u n til 1983.
Other elements in the construction of the indices are worth mentioning.
First, whereas the post-1996 editions clearly distinguish between controls on
inflows and outflows, the text information in pre-1996 editions may not always
contain information on both types of flows. My indices then account for restric-
tions on inflows and outflows without systematically discriminating between the
two. This is in contrast with the pre-1996 IMF dummies, which, as noted earlier,
are limited to restrictions on outflows. Second, some countries have restrictions
on foreign equity participation in some sectors. The new AREAER will compute
this as a double restriction in both capital market securities and in 
foreign direct investment (FDI). I believe this to be double counting and thus
compute the measure as a single restriction on FDI. Since no approach is unam-
biguously correct, I indicate these sensitive cases with a note in the relevant cell
on the spreadsheet. Third, many countries have restrictions on foreign invest-
ment in sectors related to defense and public order. Contrary to the AREAER,
A NEW SET OF MEASURES ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS
283I chose not to consider these as capital controls. I again indicate these sensitive
cases with a note.13
Finally, given that the AREAER fails to provide consistent information on
whether countries enforce their restrictions, I attribute a value of 1 whenever a con-
trol exists, regardless of whether it is enforced. These are fully de jure measures. An
exception happens whenever the AREAER indicates explicitly that a given restriction
has never been used or enforced. In this case I consider it as nonexistent.14 Once
again, I report these rare situations with a note in the relevant cell.
II. Comparison with Alternative Measures
Space considerations prevent a display of the 13 dummies for all countries and all
years in the paper. An average over the 13 dummies for each country and each year
is presented in Table 2. Tables 3 and 4 present the IMF single dummy and the LMF
measure, respectively.15
Global Trend Toward Capital Account Liberalization
Most economists agree that in the past two decades the world has slowly but steadily
moved toward greater capital account openness. While this trend may have been
deeper in developed countries, it was not necessarily restricted to them.16 To see
whether the disaggregated indices capture this trend, I computed a global index for
each year by simply averaging over the individual country indices. I also computed
a global index from the single dummies and the LMF measure.17As can be seen in
Figure 1, the disaggregated global index (labeled “Miniane” index in the figure)
exhibits a pronounced and continued downward trend, from a peak near 0.7 in
1983 to a low around 0.41 in 1999–2000. It is also interesting to note that the down-
ward trend seems to accelerate from the late 1980s to early 1990s. As I show in the
next subsection, this is precisely the period during which many European and some
Latin American countries were opening their capital accounts.
The single-dummy and LMF measures exhibit a similar downward trend despite
a reversal in the mid- to late 1990s for the former.18An important difference between
Jacques Miniane
284
13These small changes explain why my disaggregated indices may differ slightly from those published
by the IMF for the years 1995–2000.
14One such example is restrictions on FDI instituted in the United Kingdom in 1973.
15No dummies are provided for Switzerland before 1995. There are no data for Greece in the LMF
measure, and Luxembourg is pooled with Belgium.
16The following section addresses specific liberalization episodes in both developing and developed
countries. Also, in the words of Michel Camdessus, then the IMF’s managing director: “There is also a
considerable amount of work to be done at the national and international level to ensure that the pre-
conditions for the freedom of capital movements are in place. But the big picture is clear: there is an
irreversible trend toward capital account convertibility.... ”( C a m dessus, 1998).
17In Table 4 we can see that a higher value of the LMF measure means more openness, in contrast to
the other two indices. For comparability purposes the LMF global index is computed from 1 minus the
original LMF value.
18Even though the LMF index appears to have the most pronounced downward trend, cardinal com-
parisons between indices are not possible since they measure very different things.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the three processes is that, in the case of the IMF dummy, the trend is driven solely
by developed countries. To illustrate this, Figures 2 and 3 repeat the exercise in
Figure 1 by constructing developing and developed countries subindices for each of
the three measures.19 All of them fall considerably throughout the period for the
group of developed countries, but only the disaggregated and LMF measures fall for
developing nations. The IMF dummy is flat (or increases) for much of the period and
falls only in the last year of the sample.
Showing a more detailed perspective, Table 5 computes pairwise time-series
correlations between global indices. While these are generally high (above 75 per-
cent), they fall substantially to around 50 percent in the case of the developing coun-
tries’single-dummy subindex. Table 5 also computes for each of the three measures
the share of countries for which the country-specific index was higher on average in
the first half than in the second half of the period. That share is 100 percent, 82 per-
cent, and 36 percent for the LMF, disaggregated, and single-dummy measures,
respectively. In the case of developing countries, the IMF single dummy falls from
A NEW SET OF MEASURES ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS
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19I used two criteria for categorizing countries: whether the country is considered “emerging” and
included in JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI), and the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators, which classify a country as high income if annual GNP/capita exceeds US$9,076. Both crite-
































Figure 1. Evolution of Global Indices—All Countriesthe first to the second half in just 17 percent of the countries. In short, the single
dummies belie the fact that liberalization has also occurred in developing nations,
albeit at a slower rate than in developed ones.
Cross-Sectional Comparisons
To compare the indices not through time but cross-sectionally, Table 6 ranks the
countries from most to least open according to the three measures. For each mea-
sure, a country’s index is computed as the average value across all years in the
sample. Note that, in the case of the single dummies, all countries up to the United
States rank as equally open, and all countries below Brazil as equally closed.20
Reassuringly, the rankings are pretty similar across measures. If one decomposes
the sample in three groups according to the IMF single dummy (above the United
States, between the United States and Brazil, and below Brazil), then five out of nine
countries in the top group also rank among the top nine in the two other measures.21
Jacques Miniane
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20See Table 3 for country details. This bundling of countries results from the crudeness of the 0/1
dummy. No two countries are tied in the disaggregated and LMF measures.

































Figure 2. Evolution of Global Indices—Developed NationsFor the middle and lower groups, this number is 6 out of 13 and 6 out of 10 respec-
tively. In other words, the measures agree pretty closely about which countries are
very open or very closed and less so about the middle ground.
If one computes cross-country correlations (also in Table 6), the correlation is
highest between the two AREAER-based measures (73 percent). This is not sur-
prising given that they share a common source of information. Correlations remain
relatively high (around 60 percent) with respect to the LMF measure. Finally, note
that many countries in the single-dummy classification are shown as having no
restrictions in any year (see Table 3). This is a fallacy that is refuted by the text in
the AREAER itself. Indeed, no country in the disaggregated sample ever shows an
index of zero for any year. This can be partly explained by the fact that the single
dummies account only for controls on outflows as noted by Eichengreen (2001).
Country-Specific Liberalization Episodes
So far, comparisons between measures have dealt with general time-series or cross-
sectional trends. The purpose of this section is to study specific liberalization
episodes and show how these episodes are tracked by the disaggregated index but
not by the single dummy. The LMF measure cannot be used to date liberalization































Figure 3. Evolution of Global Indices—Developing Nationsepisodes, as it shows a rather smooth opening throughout the period for all countries
in the sample. Table 7 summarizes the measures undertaken during 16 liberalization/
tightening episodes captured by the disaggregated index.22
Japan’s Big Bang
One of the most talked about liberalization processes has been Japan’s Big Bang.
Launched in late 1995, the Big Bang is a staggered but far-reaching reform of the
financial sector, which policymakers hope will help the country tap more efficiently
into its deep reserves of savings. The list of liberalizing measures pertaining to 
Jacques Miniane
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22A liberalization is defined as a decline of at least 0.3 in the index. The set of liberalizations is quite
robust to reasonable changes in this value. Note that some noteworthy capital control programs are not
summarized in the table, as they are not captured by the index. These are mostly programs put in place in
the midst of external crises. The next section addresses this issue in detail.
Table 5. Summary Statistics for Global Trends
Correlation Between Global Indices
Miniane LMF IMF dummy
Miniane 1
All countries LMF 82% 1
IMF dummy 95% 94% 1
Miniane 1
Developed LMF 77% 1
IMF dummy 95% 93% 1
Miniane 1
Developing LMF 90% 1
IMF dummy 48% 54% 1
Liberalization Measure
Miniane 82%








Source: Author's own computations.
Note: The liberalization measure computes the percentage of countries in which the value for the
second half of the period was lower than for the first half.
(text continues on page 302)A NEW SET OF MEASURES ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS
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Table 6. Cross-Sectional Comparison
Ranking of Countries
Miniane LMF IMF Dummy




Germany United Kingdom Netherlands*
Denmark Sweden Singapore*
Singapore Canada Switzerland*
United States Australia United Kingdom*

















South Africa Argentina Greece




Brazil India South Africa*
Chile Turkey*
Cross-Sectional Correlation




Source: Author's own computations.
Notes: The ranking is from most to least open. In the IMF dummy ranking, all countries above
the United States are tied with the United States, and all countries below Brazil are tied with Brazil.
An asterisk denotes that the country appears in the same group in all three measures (see text for
details).Jacques Miniane
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Table 7. Summary of Main Liberalization/
Tightening Episodes Captured in the Data






Drops from 0.92 in 1986 to
0.31 in 1996
Drops from 0.69 in 1988 to
0.31 in 1991
Drops from 0.46 in 1998 to
0.15 in 1999
Drops from 0.69 in 1983 to
0.08 in 1990
Drops from 0.85 in 1983 to
0.39 in 2000
–S eptember 1 and November 9, 1989: Liberalization
of FDI, which can now be undertaken without prior
approval and is subject to the same laws as those
governing resident investors.
–D ecember 20, 1989: Foreign borrowing and
lending are liberalized and proceeds from all
loans are transacted in the free exchange market.
–S eptember 8, 1993: Elimination of remaining
restrictions on the repatriation of capital and
profits.
–F ebruary 1, 1989: All restrictions on long-term
transfers are abolished, except the issuance of
securities on foreign capital markets and of
foreign securities in domestic markets.
–N ovember 4, 1991: Foreign exchange controls are
abolished.
–A pril 5, 1999: Most controls on transactions with
securities of non-EU origin are eliminated.
–J anuary 1, 1984: Purchases by residents of foreign
shares listed on the stock exchange are freed, as are
investments by nonresidents in futures markets.
–J une 11, 1985: The length of period allowed for
residents’ foreign exchange accounts in Danish
banks is extended from one to three months. FDI
of less than DKr 10 million no longer requires
permission, compared with an earlier ceiling of
DKr 5 million. Finally, the minimum maturity for
finance loans contracted abroad is lowered from
five years to one year.
–O ctober 1, 1988: Elimination of all remaining
restrictions on inward and outward capital
movements, excepting some real estate transactions.
–A pril 5, 1983: Foreign loans with maturity of
18 months or more are authorized by the Central
Bank.
–J anuary 9, 1984: Authorization is granted for FDI
in the insurance, reinsurance, commercial banking,
and financial companies sectors. Moreover, the
limit on repatriation of profits is raised from
20 percent to 30 percent.
–J uly 29, 1987: Relaxation of ceilings on
nonresidents’ equity participation in domestic
companies despite setbacks in sectors such as
communications or internal transport.
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Table 7. (continued)
Country Changes in the Index Summary of Main Measures Undertaken
Finland
France
Drops from 0.92 in 1988 to
0.15 in 2000
Drops from 0.69 in 1987 to
0.23 in 1998
–J une 13, 1991: Limits on profit remittances are
abolished.
–D ecember 29, 1993: Income tax rates on foreign
companies are aligned with those of domestic
companies.
–J anuary 25, 1994: Public sector foreign loan dis-
bursements are no longer subject to commission.
–J anuary 27, 2000: Unification of reserve
requirements for foreign currency-denominated
and sucre-denominated accounts.
–J une 1, 1989: Regulations on FDI in the financial
and insurance sectors are liberalized.
–S eptember 1, 1989: Regulations on outward and
inward capital transfers are broadly liberalized.
–D ecember 19, 1989: Issues of markka-denominated
bonds and shares abroad by residents or at home by
nonresidents are liberalized.
–S eptember 1, 1990: Residents are allowed to
purchase and sell derivative instruments on
foreign shares.
–J anuary 1, 1991: Foreign exchange controls are
abolished except those regarding the raising of
loans abroad by private individuals.
–J anuary 1, 1992: Nonresidents are allowed to own
shares in Finnish investment trusts.
–J anuary 1, 1993: Nonresidents are allowed to
purchase Finnish securities and own Finnish
corporations without restriction. Real estate
transactions are liberalized.
–J anuary 1, 2000: Final relaxation of real estate
transactions.
–J une 1, 1988: Restrictions on foreign borrowing
are abolished. Domestic enterprises are allowed to
operate foreign currency accounts in France or
abroad.
–S eptember 24, 1988: EC residents are no 
longer required to obtain authorization for direct
investments, except when there is actual
acquisition of the firm.
–M arch 9, 1989: All exchange restrictions for
capital transactions by banks and enterprises are
abolished. Residents of all OECD countries are
allowed to issue foreign securities in France.
–J anuary 1, 1990: Firms based in OECD countries
are permitted to issue securities in France.
–O ctober 31, 1998: The issuance of euro-franc
securities is liberalized.
–D ecember 31, 1998: The issuance of certificates
of deposits is liberalized.Jacques Miniane
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Table 7. (continued)




Drops from 0.92 in 1985 to
0.08 in 1994
Increases from 0.08 in
1997 to 0.23 in 1998
Drops from 0.77 in 1987 to
0.23 in 1990
–M ay 19, 1986: All restrictions applying to EC
residents on the liquidation of investments and
repatriation of profits are eliminated.
–N ovember 23, 1988: FDI laws pertaining to EC
residents are liberalized. Personal capital transfers
to EC residents are completely liberalized.
–M arch 9, 1989: Exporting firms are allowed to
contract foreign exchange loans of maturity less
than six months.
–J uly 1, 1989: Remaining restrictions on direct
investments by EC residents are abolished.
–A ugust 20, 1990: Restrictions are lifted on the
repatriation of profits, dividends, interest,
amortization, or liquidated capital for non-EC
residents.
–J une 11, 1992: Residents are allowed to acquire
shares and bonds issued by non-EC entities under
the same terms and conditions as those applied in
EC member countries.
–J une 17, 1992: Credit institutions are allowed to
lend to individuals permanently residing abroad.
–M arch 23, 1993: All capital transactions with EU
countries are liberalized, except credits with
maturity of less than one year.
–J une 30, 1993: All capital transactions with non-
EU countries are liberalized with some individual
exceptions.
–M ay 16, 1994: Remaining controls on short-term
capital movements are abolished.
–S eptember 7, 1998: The Hong Kong Stock
Exchange reinstates the tick rule for short-selling
and reviewed the list of securities eligible for
short-selling.
–A ugust 31, 1998: The Hong Kong Futures
Exchange imposes a special margin on open
positions exceeding 10,000 contracts.
–O ctober 1, 1988: All but some restrictions on
commercial and financial transactions by residents
with nonresidents are abolished.
–J anuary 19, 1990: Residents are allowed to
purchase short-term bonds and money market
securities issued or payable abroad.
–M ay 14, 1990: The remaining restrictions on
banks’ foreign exchange management are lifted.A NEW SET OF MEASURES ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS
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Table 7. (continued)
Country Changes in the Index Summary of Main Measures Undertaken
Japan Drops from 0.69 in 1983 to
0.15 in 1999
–A pril 1, 1983: Banks are allowed to issue bonds
abroad through their subsidiaries.
–J une 6, 1983: Liberalization of short-term euro-
yen lending by Japanese banks.
–A pril 1, 1984: Restrictions on sales of yen-
denominated securities by foreign banks are
eased.
–A ugust 1, 1984: Japanese brokers are allowed to
enter international brokerage excepting
transactions between the yen and the U.S. dollar.
–J uly 1, 1985: Authorization is granted to foreign
banks to participate in the trust banking business
in Japan, including the management of corporate
pension funds.
–A pril 1, 1986: The ceiling on foreign currency-
denominated assets purchases by pension funds
is eased.
–A ugust 15, 1986: A similar easing is approved for
the insurance sector.
–M ay 22, 1987: Certain banks and securities
companies are allowed to transact financial
futures abroad for their own accounts.
–J anuary 9, 1988: Issuance of commercial paper by
nonresidents is permitted.
–J une 16, 1989: The issuance of yen-denominated
bonds abroad by nonresidents is fully liberalized.
–J uly 30, 1990: Foreign deposit accounts are
liberalized.
–A pril 26, 1991: Reporting requirements for FDI
are eased.
–J anuary 1, 1993: Further liberalization of FDI
reporting requirements. With some exceptions,
foreign investors are now required to report their
investments only ex post.
–A ugust 2, 1995: Wide-ranging measures to
promote overseas investments and loans by
institutional investors, including liberalization of
foreign currency-denominated loans and removal
of restrictions of yen-denominated external loans.
–J anuary 1, 1998: Limits on pension funds’ foreign
exchange investments are removed.
–A pril 1, 1998: The prior notice requirement for
portfolio and direct investments abroad by
residents is abolished.
–A pril 1, 1998: The waiting period for loans
extended to nonresidents is abolished.Jacques Miniane
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Table 7. (continued)




Drops from 0.46 in 1985 to
0.08 in 1986
Drops from 0.77 in 1983 to
0.23 in 1989
Drops from 0.92 in 1985 to
0.15 in 1999
–J anuary 1, 1986: Restrictions on capital movements
are lifted.
–J une 8, 1984: Foreign banks are allowed to
operate in Norway subject to the same general
conditions as Norwegian banks.
–J une 15, 1984: Residents are allowed to purchase
(quoted) foreign shares as well as foreign bonds.
–M ay 9, 1988: Nonresidents are allowed to
purchase long-term bonds denominated in
Norwegian kroner.
–J une 14, 1988: Residents are allowed to incur or
provide commercial and financial guarantee
obligations abroad.
–J une 30, 1989: Residents are allowed to acquire
shares of foreign collective investment funds
without prior authorization.
–D ecember 8, 1989: Individuals are allowed to
obtain foreign currency loans abroad subject to a
license. Legal entities are allowed to engage in
financial leasing in foreign currencies with
Norwegian banks without prior authorization and
with foreign banks with liberally granted
authorization.
–J anuary 1, 1986: Most capital transactions with
EC residents are freed.
–J uly 18, 1986: Authorization procedures for FDI
are eased.
–F ebruary 2, 1989: Limits above which medium-
and long-term capital transactions require
approval are raised.
–J uly 1, 1990: Investment in foreign securities listed
in recognized exchanges are fully liberalized.
–J une 14, 1991: Restrictions on direct and real
estate investment abroad by residents are eased.
–S eptember 1 and November 26, 1992: Financial
credits from abroad are liberalized.
–D ecember 16, 1992: Easing of restrictions on
escudo deposits for nonresidents, demand and
term deposits abroad by residents, acquisition of
money-market instruments by nonresidents, short-
term lending in escudos to nonresidents, and
foreign exchange operations between nonbank
residents and nonresidents.
–N ovember 28, 1995: Remaining restrictions on
FDI are lifted.
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Table 7. (continued)
Country Changes in the Index Summary of Main Measures Undertaken
Spain
Sweden
Drops from 0.92 in 1985 to
0.25 in 1992
Drops from 0.85 in 1983 to
0.31 in 1992
–M arch 1, 1999: Abolition of controls on the
introduction of foreign securities issued by
residents of a non-EU member country that were
not quoted on the issuer's country or on the
country of issuance.
–A pril 1, 1986: Easing of restrictions on residents’
foreign currency-denominated financial loans.
–J une 27 and September 25, 1986: Authorization is
no longer required for FDI in oil refining, mining,
sea transport, and insurance.
–N ovember 7, 1986: Investments abroad by residents
are liberalized, including portfolio investments.
–M arch 13, 1987: Limits on foreign loans not
related to merchandise trade are raised to pesetas
1.5 million.
–M ay 25, 1987: Investments abroad are further
liberalized, with real estate investments partially
liberalized for the first time.
–J une 10, 1988: The minimum maturity period of
foreign currency borrowing not subject to
authorization is raised to three years.
–D ecember 19, 1988: Direct investments abroad in
companies engaged in portfolio and real estate
investment activities are permitted.
–A pril 4, 1990: Remaining restrictions on
purchases of foreign monetary instruments by
residents are removed.
–J une 22, 1990: Residents are allowed to purchase
securities denominated in pesetas and issued in
Spain by nonresidents.
–J uly 8, 1990: Nonresidents are allowed to freely
purchase securities in Spanish exchanges.
–D ecember 27, 1990: Most remaining regulations
limiting portfolio investments by residents abroad
and by nonresidents in Spain are abolished.
–A pril 16, 1991: Residents are allowed to maintain
accounts in foreign currency in authorized banks.
–J uly 1, 1992: Most remaining controls on capital
transfers are abolished.
–F ebruary 21 and May 22, 1984: Restrictions on
the maturity and amount of foreign currency
borrowing are eased.
–A pril 14 and June 24, 1986: Restrictions on direct
investment abroad by residents are eased.
–M arch 25, 1986: Residents are allowed to purchase
derivative instruments on foreign securities.
(continued)various items in the capital account includes the following:23 elimination of the
approval period for outward direct investments in all but some sectors, elimination
of the 5-3-3-2 rule for pension fund managers,24 elimination of the waiting period to
resell yen-denominated securities issued abroad to Japanese residents, elimination of
the waiting period for loans extended by residents to nonresidents, and liberalization
of foreign currency-denominated external loans by insurance companies.
The disaggregated index drops by 50 percent during the short period under con-
sideration, from 0.46 in 1995 to 0.23 in 1998. Japan still had restrictions left at the
end of 1998, such as ceilings on the investment in foreign currency-denominated
bonds by credit cooperatives, limits on the share of their total assets insurance com-
panies can invest in securities issued by nonresidents, and controls on inward direct
investment, which prevented the index from dropping even further. Strikingly
enough, the single dummy shows Japan as having no controls before the Big Bang.
This is obviously erroneous in light of what has been said, even accounting for the
fact that the dummy tracks only controls on outflows.
Liberalization episodes in Europe
Parallel to the creation of the European single market in goods and services,Articles
56 and 57 of the European Union Treaty call for the lifting of all restrictions on cap-
ital movements among Member States and between Member States and third coun-
tries, the latter with some qualifications. This pushed many European countries to
liberalize their capital accounts in the mid- to late 1980s.
One such country is Austria. In 1989, the country started by eliminating vir-
tually all restrictions on long-term capital transfers and pursued its efforts through
Jacques Miniane
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23A more detailed account appears in various editions of the AREAER publication.
24This rule required managers to hold 50 percent or more of assets under management in bank
deposits, bonds, or loans; 30 percent or less in stocks; 30 percent or less in foreign currency-denominated
assets; and 20 percent or less in real estate property.
Table 7. (concluded)
Country Changes in the Index Summary of Main Measures Undertaken
–M arch 1, 1987: Further easing of restrictions of
foreign borrowing.
–J anuary 9, 1989: All restrictions on the acquisition
of foreign equity are abolished.
–J uly 1, 1989: Virtually all remaining currency
regulations are abolished, but transactions must
still be carried through an authorized Swedish
bank or broker.
–J anuary 1, 1992: Transactions need no longer be
carried through authorized currency traders.
–D ecember 31, 1992: Residents are authorized to
deposit funds in foreign banks.1991 when it abolished all remaining foreign exchange controls. Some restrictions
on inward direct investment and the establishment of foreign banks remained. The
disaggregated index for Austria does indeed fall from 0.69 in 1988 to 0.31 in 1991.
Another interesting case is Denmark, which opted for a one-shot rather than a
staggered approach, and on October 1, 1988, eliminated all restrictions on inward
and outward capital transfers while maintaining some prudential measures regu-
lating net positions in foreign currencies. Once again, the disaggregated index
reflects the nature of these changes and falls from 0.62 in 1987 to 0.15 in 1988.
The single dummy also captures these liberalization events, as can be seen in
Table 3, even though the values of 1 and zero overstate the level of restrictiveness
before liberalization and understate it after. But for other European countries, the
single dummy completely missed the liberalization episode. In the case of Greece,
the dummy keeps a value of 1 up to 1995. However, Greece had previously under-
gone major reform starting in 1986 with the elimination of all restrictions applying
to residents of other European Community (EC) countries and moving to the autho-
rization granted in 1987 to repatriate capital and profits in respect to borrowings
from non-EC countries; the full liberalization in 1989 of direct investments in EC
countries by residents of Greece; the authorization granted in 1992 to acquire div-
idends, bonds, and shares issued in non-EC countries under the same conditions
applied to EC member countries; and culminating in 1994 with the elimination of
all remaining controls on short-term capital movements. Contrary to the common
IMF measure, the disaggregated index in Table 2 closely tracks liberalization,
falling from 0.92 in 1985 to 0.62 in 1990 to 0.08 in 1994.
Norway is another case where the disaggregated index picks up the opening of
the capital account missed by the single dummy. Among other measures passed by
Norway in 1989 one finds authorization granted to residents to provide commercial
and financial guarantee obligations abroad with no permission from the Bank of
Norway, authorization granted to nonresidents to issue bonds denominated in kroner
in Norway subject to a license, and authorization for nonresidents to purchase bonds
with a maturity of at least one year. While the disaggregated index falls from 0.69 in
1988 to 0.23 in 1989, the AREAER dummy remains equal to 1 up until the intro-
duction of disaggregated indices.
Liberalization episodes in Latin America
Argentina is a well-known case of liberalization in an emerging economy. Starting
with Carlos Menem’s rise to power in 1989, Argentina embarked on a far-reaching
liberalization of the economy, including an opening of the capital account.25Among
the measures undertaken one can find the liberalization of international credit oper-
ations in December of 1989, or the liberalization of FDI contained in the Economic
Emergency Law of September 1989. Indeed, the disaggregated measure falls from
0.75 in 1988 to 0.31 in 1996. The latter figure can be explained by the fact that
Argentina left some restrictions in place: for example, mutual funds could not
A NEW SET OF MEASURES ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS
303
25Argentina has reversed this trend in the past couple of years following the country’s financial col-
lapse. Reversal is not captured in the indices since it occurred after the end of the sample period.invest more than 25 percent of assets under management in non-Mercosur securi-
ties, and issues of derivatives by nonresidents required approval above and beyond
that requested from domestic residents. Liberalization was also tracked by the IMF
dummy, with one major caveat: the change in the dummy was recorded in 1993,
a full four years after the main package of liberalization measures. And once
again, the zero value of the index post-1993 overstates the degree of capital
account openness.
Another Latin American country to have experienced an opening of its capital
account between 1983 and 2000—albeit more gradually and with some setbacks—
is Ecuador. Opening measures spread across many years have included a relaxation
of foreign equity participation ceilings in July 1987 and the elimination of limits on
profit remittances in June 1991. As of December 2000, Ecuador still retained con-
trols on the issue of money market and collective investment instruments by non-
residents and required approval from the Central Bank for all foreign loans. When
one looks at the disaggregated measure, it falls gradually from 0.85 in 1983 to 0.39
in 2000, with an increase in 1985. Puzzlingly enough, the IMF dummy has a value
of zero in 1983–85, not at all consistent with the text information in the AREAER,
which does signal substantial controls on inflows and outflows. After increasing in
1986 (consistent with the change in 1985 in the disaggregated measure), the IMF
dummy falls back to zero in 1988. This is once again contradicted by the text infor-
mation. Finally, the single dummy becomes 1 in 1993 at a time of partial easing of
restrictions. The value of the IMF dummy does not seem close to representing
actual policies in the country.
III. Limitations of the Measure (and Some Possible Solutions)
This section addresses some of the obvious and not so obvious limitations of the
disaggregated measure and proposes tentative solutions. Arguably, the single
greatest liability of the measure is that it does not discriminate between controls
on inflows and outflows; the reasons for this choice on a pre-1996 AREAER-based
measure have already been discussed.26
Missing on Liberalization and Tightening Episodes
A limitation of the data is that they miss important capital control programs insti-
tuted in the midst of external crises. Indeed, part of the reason why capital controls
are back in vogue is the perception that Malaysia escaped a harsher fate during the
recent Asian crisis by imposing a one-year holding period for nonresidents’ portfo-
lio capital in September 1998.27 As can be seen in Table 2, these controls are not
“recorded” in the indices. Similarly, the indices do not show any evidence of the
Jacques Miniane
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26Quinn’s measure does not discriminate between the two types of flow either. Edison and Warnock
(2003) measure only controls on inflows. One could, in principle, separate assets and liabilities in the Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti measure, but the fact that one side is greater than the other may not mean different
degrees of restrictiveness for inflows and for outflows.
27See Edison and Reinhart (2001) and Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) for formal analyses of Malaysia’s
experience.temporary control programs instituted in Portugal, Spain, or Sweden at the height of
the 1992 exchange rate mechanism (ERM) crisis, such as Spain’s imposition of a
compulsory one-year, non-interest-bearing deposit to be held at the Central Bank.28
There are two main reasons why the data fail to capture these episodes. First, the
AREAER shows restrictions in place as of December 31 of each year: measures
that are put in place for some months and then removed may not get factored into
the index. Second, controls that are still in place as of December 31 of the year
will not affect the index if they come on top of other existing restrictions in that
subcategory. This is what happened in the case of Malaysia, a country that already
had restrictions in all capital markets’ subcategories.
Besides emergency tightenings, the data also miss some noteworthy liberal-
izations. For instance, Brazil’s index value remains equal to 1 up until 1997,
when it drops slightly to 0.92. But Brazil underwent an opening of its capital
account before 1997. Starting in 1992, the country liberalized the participation
by foreigners in the privatization process, nonfinancial residents were permitted
to invest up to US$1 million abroad without prior approval, corporations estab-
lished in Brazil were authorized to issue and place abroad securities that could
be converted into equity, prepayment of foreign borrowing and import financing
was permitted, and the minimum period for the renewal and extension of foreign
credit was lowered. But why didn’t the index fall? Consider the possibility to
invest up to US$1 million abroad with no approval. This is certainly less restric-
tive than the previous situation where every single investment required autho-
rization, but absence of full liberalization means the FDI category will still show
a value of 1. The same happens with the lowering of the minimum period for
renewal of foreign credit.
One possible solution to the problems recorded in this subsection would be to
follow Cardoso and Goldfajn’s (1997) methodology. They track every single cap-
ital control enacted in Brazil from 1983 to 1995. Every time a new control is put
in place or an existing one becomes more stringent, their index goes up by 1, and
the opposite happens following the relaxation or abandonment of existing mea-
sures. However, such a time-consuming undertaking may not be realistic for a
sample of 34 countries.
Enforcement of Controls
Besides the severity of controls, the question remains as to what extent the controls
are effectively enforced. In this respect, de facto measures such as Edison and
Warnock’s and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s provide only partial answers. An alterna-
tive solution would be to weight the disaggregated indices by indirect proxies for
enforcement, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.
Even though some relatively uncorrupted countries may lack the means to enforce
controls effectively, corruption indices are likely to be a good proxy for enforce-
ability. The Transparency International measures are available for all the countries
A NEW SET OF MEASURES ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS
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28See Fielecke (1994) and Edison and Reinhart (2001) for an analysis of controls implemented dur-
ing the ERM crisis.in the sample. They cover only the past eight years, but this is a small price to pay
given that corruption is a relatively slow-changing phenomenon.
Data Frequency
There is no denying that a monthly rather than an annual index could be of great
use for many research projects. It is theoretically possible to construct a monthly
index from the yearly AREAER data in a reasonably time-efficient manner. Take for
a given country its yearly index. If there is no change between years t and (t + 1),
then all months of (t + 1) stay equal to the yearly (t + 1) index. Whenever there is
change from year to year, one can identify the subcategories where the change
occurred from the disaggregated information in the yearly index. The “Changes”
section of the year (t + 1) edition of the AREAER will then specify the exact date
of change in those subcategories. It remains to be seen whether one would obtain
enough monthly variance for such an index to be of any use.
Are All Categories Relevant Throughout the Sample Period?
There is a risk that some of the post-1996 subcategories rendered important through
financial innovation may have been irrelevant at the beginning of the sample period.
This problem can be measured indirectly by computing the proportion of times that
a given subcategory was filled by default rather than through explicit information.
Indeed, for the year 1983, the categories “collective investment securities” and
“derivatives and other instruments” were filled by default in 50 percent of the cases,
versus 25 percent for all categories combined. There is no easy answer to this prob-
lem, but the usefulness of explicitly stating how a dummy was coded again
becomes apparent. A researcher using the data can easily weight each subcategory
by the proportion of countries in which the subcategory was coded through explicit
information. This would indeed have assigned the smallest weight to the two cate-
gories mentioned above. Alternatively, one could exclude a subcategory if it was
filled by default in more than x percent of the cases and examine the robustness of
the final indices to reasonable changes in x.
IV. Conclusion
This paper adds to the growing list of capital control measures that build on the
post-1996 disaggregated methodology. The indices, nominally 13 times more pre-
cise than the common IMF single dummy, do a better job at tracking both world
trends toward greater capital account openness and specific liberalization episodes
that occurred in various countries under study. The indices could be improved in
several directions: greater country/year coverage, greater disaggregation, better
consideration of the severity of the controls or their actual enforcement, better
tracking of temporary capital control measures to fight speculative attacks, and
more careful distinction between controls on inflows and outflows. As they stand,
they are an important step forward relative to the previous IMF measures. They
complement without substituting other indices recently published in the literature,
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gregation or explicit consideration of missing information. Together with these
other indicators they can be of considerable help for researchers trying to quantify
the costs and benefits of capital controls, a major issue in the current reformula-
tion of the global financial architecture.
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